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Abstract
This paper examines how Swiss plants respond to a carbon tax that was increased by
400% during the period 2008-2015. In response to the tax and unrelated to sector affiliation,
we find that while plants reduced carbon emissions by 12-15%, energy consumption fell by
4-6%. These results are consistent with a series of CO2 fuel tax elasticities estimates ranging
between -0.1 and -0.23. Plants in the service sector exclusively reduced emissions by con-
suming less fossil fuels, whereas plants in the industry sector also increasingly switched to
the less carbon-intensive natural gas. Finally, more heavily taxed plants due to a relatively
carbon-intensive energy mix as well as plants with high pre-policy emission levels decreased
emissions disproportionately.
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1 Introduction
Global warming is one of the most fundamental and pressing challenges humankind is facing in
present times. The rise in the global average temperature is predicted to intensify the occurrence
of natural disasters and lead to a substantial increase in the sea level therefore posing a significant
threat to the environment and ultimately to the welfare of entire societies. Carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions accumulate over time in the atmosphere and are the main culprit for anthropogenic
global warming (IPCC, 2013).1 As a consequence, nations across the globe have started setting
up joint initiatives since the early 90s to reduce the level of climate-damaging emissions and
thereby counter the adverse long-term consequences of global warming. In the more recent
Paris conference in 2015, nearly 200 countries agreed to limit the increase in the global average
temperature well below 2◦ Celsius above pre-industrial levels.
There exists a broad consensus among economists that putting a price on carbon emissions
either through the introduction of a tax or via emission trading systems is an efficient policy
to reduce CO2 emissions (e.g. Elkins & Baker, 2001; Arrow et al., 1997). Nonetheless, 85% of
current global emissions are not priced, including emissions from large emitting countries such
as the United States (Stern & Stiglitz, 2017). This lack of a more widespread implementation
of carbon pricing schemes may be explained by their low current political acceptability in the
general public, in particular due to concerns about their efficiency and distributional effects
(Klenert et al., 2018). Despite the importance of this topic, the empirical evidence on the ex-
post effects of carbon taxes on household and firm behavior remains scarce (e.g. Anderson, 2017;
Martin et al., 2014).2 Additional research on its effectiveness may thus enhance the credibility
and acceptability of carbon pricing and its subsequent implementation across a larger number
of political entities.
In this paper, we study the impact of the introduction and increase of a carbon tax on
the behavior of plants active in the service and industry sector in Switzerland. Using plant-
level data for the years 2001-2015, we provide microeconometric evidence on how plants’ energy
consumption and carbon emissions respond to a rising carbon tax and thus contribute to a
broader literature on the relationship between market-based climate policies and firm behavior
(see, e.g., Metcalf, 2009; Fischer & Newell, 2008 for an overview). Our findings are highly
relevant for policymakers as the industry and service sector account for about 40% of global
CO2 emissions (IEA, 2017). In terms of empirical scope and data, our study is most closely
related to the work of Martin et al. (2014) who find significant reductions in the energy intensity
and electricity use of plants after the introduction of the UK carbon tax in the early 2000s. A
notable difference to their study is that in the Swiss setting we can empirically exploit the
increase in the carbon tax of 400% between its introduction in 2008 and the year 2014. As a
consequence, we are able to estimate fuel tax elasticities using the methodology suggested by
Marion & Mu¨hlegger (2008) and Li et al. (2014). In addition, we present novel insights about
substitution patterns across energy sources as our data allows us to capture the carbon tax effect
on plants’ use of light oil, natural gas and electricity at the extensive (yes/no-decision about the
1Global CO2 emissions reached a historic high of 32.5 gigatonnes (Gt) in 2017 (IEA, 2017).
2In contrast, the interplay between emission trading systems and firm behavior is better studied in the literature
(e.g. Koch et al., 2014; Aatola et al., 2013; Betz & Sato, 2006).
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use of a specific energy source) and the intensive margin (amount consumed). Lastly, we also
contribute to a deeper understanding of the heterogeneous effects of the carbon tax across plants
that differ in their sector affiliation, their pre-policy emission levels or tax exposure according
to the carbon-intensity of their fossil fuel mix.
The main econometric challenge of this paper is to disentangle the effect of the carbon tax
from changes in the economic activity, technological innovations and other policies affecting
plant behavior. Our empirical strategy is three-fold: In a first step, we estimate the effect
of the carbon tax while conditioning on plant characteristics, annual temperature patterns,
business cycle indicators and energy prices. In contrast to simple pre-post analysis, we exploit
the increasing treatment intensity of the tax over time, include plant fixed effects to account
for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between entities and common time trends to absorb
technological and policy innovations other than the carbon tax. This first approach provides
within plant estimates of the carbon tax effect compared to pre-policy period after controlling
for a wide set of time-varying covariates.
In a second step, we estimate various difference-in-difference specifications. Methodologically,
this allows us to account for potentially unobserved time-varying confounders. The identifying
assumption is that these confounders do not induce trends to diverge between treatment and
control group. This is also known as the parallel trend assumption. In this framework, we exploit
variation in the tax intensity plants face depending on the carbon-intensity of their pre-policy
fossil fuel mix. As we find some weak evidence for violations of the parallel trend assumption in
the ”placebo” pre-policy period, we apply a tripple-difference procedure that removes the pre-
policy effect from the diff-in-diff estimate in the policy period. In other specifications, we include
plant-specific trends as a means of capturing diverging trends. In this case, the identification of
the carbon tax effect hinges on whether this policy leads to deviations of plant emissions from
plant-specific trends. More generally, while we extensively employ trends to capture innovations
other than the carbon tax in many estimations, they are also likely to absorb some of the carbon
tax effect that manifests itself in trend changes.3 In addition, since reducing emissions requires
substantial investments, the carbon tax effect is likely to unfold only gradually over time within
plants. This exacerbates the problem of disentangling the carbon tax effect from underlying
trend changes. We consequently interpret the results from specifications with plant-specific
trends as lower-bound estimates of the differential carbon tax effect. Moreover, we take long
differences of plant outcomes that encompass the entire policy (2008-2015) and placebo (2001-
2008) period in some regressions in order to permit the carbon tax effect to grow over time among
other reasons (see Section 5.1). In the estimations with annual data the likely gradual response of
the carbon tax is taken into account by adding policy variables for each period with an increased
tax level. These dummy indicators capture how the carbon tax effect accumulates over time
in the policy period with respect to the baseline pre-policy period. In further regressions, we
also use the fossil fuel mix in the beginning of the sample period to instrument the potentially
endogenous fossil fuel mix in the beginning of the policy period. The concern is that plants might
have adjusted their fossil fuel mix in anticipation to the future carbon tax policy. Reassuringly,
the IV estimates provide almost identical results to OLS estimations in terms of magnitude and
3For example, the adoption of cleaner technologies or the use of subsidy programs induced by the carbon tax
plausibly result in a downward shift in the emission trend at the plant-level.
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statistical significance. In the last step, we confirm the importance of the carbon tax effect with
estimations of the CO2 fuel tax elasticities that are consistent with previous results.
Our results show that the carbon tax led to a cumulative reduction in the energy consumption
by about 4-6% for the average plant in the post-policy period. In addition, our estimates indicate
significant reductions in CO2 emissions as a response to the tax: In particular, we find that the
typical plant reduced emissions by about 2% upon introduction of the tax in the first policy
period (2008-2009). With the subsequent increase in the tax, the effect increased to reductions
between 3-6% in the second post-policy period (2010-2012) and up to 12-15% in the third post-
policy period (2013-2015) relative to the pre-policy years. Given that the average pre-policy
emission level was at approximately 610 tons of CO2, the estimated policy effects are sizeable
and imply cumulative reductions in the magnitude of about 70-90 tons of CO2 for the average
plant in the sample. Our estimates provide empirical evidence that the described emission
reductions were mostly achieved by significant reductions in the consumption of both light
oil and natural gas. However, this observation masks some substantial differences in how the
emission reductions were achieved across sectors. Plants in the industry sector solely reduced
light oil consumption (intensive margin) and increasingly started to substitute light oil with
natural gas (extensive margin). In contrast, plants in the service sector uniformly reduced fuel
consumption across both fuel types (intensive margin) without significantly switching to the less
carbon-intensive natural gas (extensive margin).
We also assess whether plants with a carbon-intensive fossil fuel mix respond differently to
the carbon tax than plants with a relatively low carbon-intensity. To this end, we compare plants
which entirely relied on energy from light oil (treatment group) to those who exclusively used
energy from natural gas (control group) as the tax burden for the former is substantially higher
in the post-policy period. In our preferred tripple-difference specification with long differences,
the higher tax burden of the pure light fuel users leads to emission savings of about 23% relative
to pure natural gas users. In lower-bound estimates that use plant-specific trends instead of
subsector-specific trends the difference between treatment and control group reduces to 7%. We
also provide evidence that the emission reductions are primarily accomplished by plants with
higher pre-policy emission levels (relative to the sector-median). Finally, our estimates of fuel
tax elasticities are consistent with previous results overall. The tax elasticity for light oil ranges
from -0.1 to -0.23, while the effect of the tax on natural gas is entirely driven by the service
sector with an estimated elasticity of -0.17 in that sector.
Overall, our findings impart novel insights about the interplay between an increasing carbon
tax and plant behavior along several important dimensions as we demonstrate their effectiveness
in inducing plants to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions. Our results are relevant not only for
the academic community but also for policymakers intended to design effective climate policy
instruments in the near future.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional
background and the details about the Swiss carbon tax. Section 3 gives an overview of the data
and key variables used to analyze the carbon tax effects. In Section 4, we discuss the effect
of the carbon tax on various plant outcomes, while Section 5 presents difference-in-difference
estimations. Next, we explore the heterogeneity of the carbon tax effect in Section 6 and provide
tax elasticity estimates in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Institutional Background
2.1 The Swiss carbon tax
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Switzerland agreed to drastically reduce its green house gas (GHG)
emissions. Specifically, Switzerland committed to reduce its GHG emission by 8% relative to the
levels of 1990 in the first Kyoto commitment period between 2008-2012. In addition, the GHG
reduction target was increased to 20% in the second, still ongoing, Kyoto commitment period
between 2013-2020 (Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN), 2018). In order to reach these
ambitious emission reduction goals, the Federal Act on the Reduction of CO2 Emissions was
enacted in 2008 by the Swiss parliament introducing three main climate policy instruments: the
Swiss emission trading scheme (ETS), target agreements and most relevant for the majority of
plants in the industry and service sector, a CO2 levy on fossil fuels.
4 The CO2 levy is a per unit
tax on the CO2 emissions stemming from the consumption of fossil fuels including heating oil,
natural gas and coal.5
The initial level of the carbon tax was set at 12 Swiss Francs (henceforth CHF6) per ton of
CO2 emissions in 2008. Important for this study, the CO2 Act stipulates tax increases if the
predefined emission reductions are not met by the industry (Art. 94 of the CO2 Act). In fact, the
tax was raised in 2010 to 36 CHF, in 2014 to 60 CHF, in 2016 to 84 CHF and lately, it was further
increased to a level of 96 CHF in 2018. In 2016, public revenues from the CO2 levy amounted
to 1.074 billion CHF: Around two thirds of the levy revenues are uniformly redistributed on an
annual basis to all residents living in Switzerland and to the business community in proportion
to their employees’ social insurance contributions. One third of the revenue up to a maximum
of CHF 450 million flows into the buildings program for energy efficiency improving renovations.
2.2 Tax burden under the Swiss carbon tax
Since the Swiss carbon tax is based on the amount of CO2 emissions in tons, it varies substantially
across different fossil fuel types depending on their carbon intensity. To illustrate this point,
Table 1 below shows the tax burden by type of fossil fuel and Terajoule (henceforth TJ) of energy
consumption over time. As clearly evident from the table, plants who are relying on energy from
light oil face substantially higher taxes per TJ of energy consumed than those who mainly use
energy from natural gas. Moreover, since the carbon tax was steadily increased over time to
coincide with the predefined emission reduction path, the tax burden per ton of CO2 emissions
(i) rapidly increased over time and (ii) a growing wedge in the tax burden between light oil
and natural gas can be observed rendering light oil consumption increasingly less attractive
compared to natural gas. In numbers, while plants paid 885 CHF per TJ of energy from light oil
in 2008-2009, the same amount of energy from natural gas resulted in 673 CHF in carbon taxes.
Between 2010-2013 the tax burden per TJ increased to 2’654 CHF for light oil and 2’020 CHF
4The carbon tax is by far the most common policy instrument covering more than 95% of the companies
active in Switzerland thereby defining our study population. Moreover, companies in the cement, chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, steel, paper or district heating sector are exempted from the carbon tax and thus are excluded
from our analysis.
5Note that motor fuels are not subject to the CO2 levy but are instead subject to a separate petroleum tax.
6The average exchange rate in September 2018 was 1 CHF ≈ 0.88 Euro and 1 CHF ≈ 1.03 USD.
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for natural gas. Finally, in the third post-policy period (2014-2016) when the carbon tax was
increased to 60 CHF per ton of CO2 emissions, the tax burden per TJ increased to 4’423 CHF
for light oil and 3’366 for natural gas resulting in a tax differential of more than 1000 CHF for
the same amount of energy consumed. From an economic point of view, the current carbon tax
regime provides strong financial incentives to switch towards less carbon-intensive fossil fuels
thereby affecting plant’s current and future investment decisions which in turn will be reflected
in their levels of CO2 emissions.
— Insert Table 1 about here —
3 Data
We use plant-level data from the Swiss Federal Office of Energy for the years 2001-2015 (Bach-
mann et al., 2014). The data set offers detailed information on plant’s annual energy consump-
tion and emission levels, as well as a series of plant characteristics including the number of
employees, sector affiliation and floor size of the plant. We exclude plants from our analysis
which are active in the (i) cement industry as the sector is exempted from the CO2 levy
7 and
(ii) plants which are only one year in the sample. Applying the described sample restrictions
leaves us with an unbalanced panel of of 44’909 observations from 10’290 plants active in the
industry (52.5%) and service sector (47.5%) between 2001-2015.
Figure 1 below shows the average annual energy consumption (in TJ) and CO2 emissions (in
tons) over time stratified by sector affiliation. First, the graph shows that the industry sector
(dark blue line) with an average energy consumption of approximately 35 TJ clearly exceeds the
one in the service sector (red line) of about 7 TJ. Second, in correspondence with the higher level
of energy consumption, plants in the industry sector also produce substantially higher levels of
CO2 emissions: while the average plant in the industry sector emits on average about 950 tons
of CO2 per year, firms in the service sector release about 210 tons on average. Third, energy
consumption and emission levels are fairly stable over time in the service sector. In contrast, the
industry sector displays a comparably high variation in energy-related outcomes as captured by
a substantially larger variance in both energy consumption and CO2 emissions. Moreover and
as a preliminary piece of evidence on the potential impact of the introduction of the carbon tax
in 2008 (see vertical gray lines), Figure 1 indicates a slight negative trend in emissions in the
post-policy period in the industry sector and essentially no change in emissions in the service
sector – an observation we further explore in Section 6.1.
— Insert Figure 1 about here —
3.1 Pre-post policy descriptive analysis
To further motivate the upcoming ex-post policy analysis and provide additional information
about our estimation sample, we present descriptive statistics for the pre-, as well as post-policy
7This restrictions drops 169 observations from the sample.
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years in Table 2 below. The table gives detailed information about plant energy consumption for
different energy sources including light heating oil, natural gas and electricity consumption. Note
that the original data set also contains information about the consumption of heavy oil, natural
wood, scrap wood and industrial waste. However, we refrain from using these additional energy
sources as they account for only a negligible part of plant energy consumption.8 Furthermore,
we convert fossil fuel energy sources into their CO2 equivalents in tons. In addition, we compute
indicators for the share of light oil and natural gas in each plant’s fossil fuel energy mix.
The pre-post mean comparison of the described outcomes shows that average plant energy
consumption has slightly increased over time from roughly 21 to 22.5 TJ. Yet, the difference in
means is not statistically significant thereby suggesting that the average plant did not system-
atically adjust the level of energy consumption over the observation window. However, the raw
mean comparison shows a decrease of more than 20 tons of CO2 emissions for the average plant
in the sample. The key empirical question that arises in this context is whether this change
in emissions can be attributed to the introduction of the carbon tax in 2008. Indeed, the raw
pre-post mean comparison does not necessarily capture the causal effect of the policy as there
are many possible channels which could plausibly explain the observed drop in emissions. For
example, the decrease in emissions can at least partially be explained by the significantly lower
economic growth that followed the financial crisis in 2008-09 and that persisted during the en-
tire post-policy period.9 Besides such macro shocks or comparable changes in the institutional
setting which affected all plants in the economy, technological advancements or changes in plant
characteristics more generally might have caused the emission levels to decrease. As we are go-
ing to describe further below in Section 4.1, conditioning on such macro- and plant-level factors
is a key element in our identification strategy to isolate the effect of the carbon tax on plant
outcomes. Finally, the pre-post mean comparison exercise provides evidence for substitution
patterns among the different energy sources as we observe a significant increase in average nat-
ural gas consumption and at the same time a slightly smaller decrease in light oil consumption.
In addition, there has been a remarkable increase (decrease) in the share of natural gas (light
oil) in plants’ fossil fuel mix, as shown in Figure 3 and Table 2. Interestingly, the shift from
light oil to natural gas started already in the early 2000s and thus long before the introduction
of the carbon tax.
— Insert Table 2 and Figure 3 about here —
To gain additional insights about the potential effects of the rising carbon tax on plant
behavior and outcomes, Figure 2 below shows the distribution of total energy consumption,
fossil fuel emissions, as well as light oil and natural gas consumption before and after the carbon
tax was introduced. In line with the evidence from Table 2 above, the distribution of total
energy consumption has shifted slightly to the right indicating a minor increase in plants’ energy
consumption post-policy. In contrast, the distribution of fossil fuel emissions has moved slightly
to the left after the policy change as lower emission levels have become more likely. Moreover,
8For example, the share of heavy oil accounts for less than 1% in the average plants fossil fuel mix.
9Average annual real GDP growth was at a level of roughly 2.5% in the pre-policy period and only at 1.4% in
the years after the introduction of the carbon tax.
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Figure 2 indicates that plants tend to consume less light oil post-policy as depicted by the
distinct shift of the distribution to the left, while lower levels of natural gas consumption have
also gained in probability. In the following sections, we address the question of whether there is
causal link between the carbon tax and plant outcomes.
— Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here —
4 Carbon taxes and plant outcomes
4.1 Identification of the carbon tax effect
The main empirical goal of this paper is to estimate the effect of a time-varying carbon tax
on plant energy consumption and emissions in the industry and service sector. As mentioned
above, isolating a carbon tax effect is a challenge since multiple channels besides the carbon
policy itself including, e.g., changes in the economic activity, energy prices, regulation and tech-
nological advances could potentially explain consumption and emissions patterns over time. We
first estimate specifications that condition on plant characteristics, oil price, business cycle and
weather indicators. Moreover and in contrast to simple pre-post analysis or event studies, our
specification explicitly accounts for time-invariant unobserved plant heterogeneity by including
plant fixed effects and absorbs technological progress and other preexisting trends by a linear
time trend. In our second approach in Section 5, we exploit the implicit tax intensity that plants
are exposed to depending on their fossil fuel mix. This additional variation across plants allows
us to pick up potentially unobserved time-varying confounders within a difference-in-difference
framework.
Specifically, in our first approach we capture the carbon tax effect by estimating the following
fixed effects specification:
yit = τtDt + x
′
itη +A
′
tγ + λi + λt+ εit (1)
where yit is an energy consumption/emission/fuel or electricity indicator for plant i in year t.
To capture the effect of the increasing carbon tax, specification (1) includes a vector Dt that
includes three treatment indicators each of which equaling one in the post-policy years in which
the tax remained constant at the newly set level.10 λi is a plant fixed effect capturing time-
constant plant-specific factors such as a plant’s short-term production technology or willingness
to invest in, e.g., renewable energy sources. In addition, we include a linear time trend (t)
to disentangle the carbon tax effects from common time-varying factors such as technological
advancements and/or possibly other changes in the institutional setting.11 Moreover, to isolate
the carbon policy effect from observable plant-specific characteristics, we include in xit the
number of employees and the floor size as controls for plant size. Furthermore, we control for
time-varying aggregate price, economic activity and weather indicators (in At).
12
10Note that the baseline is given by the pre-policy years.
11As a robustness checks, we additionally estimate specifications with plant-specific time trends leading to both
quantitatively and qualitatively similar results. The corresponding findings are available upon request.
12At includes an indicator for the number of heating degree days, GDP growth and an oil price index.
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4.2 Carbon taxes and plant outcomes
Table 3 below presents the effect of the rising carbon tax on total plant energy consumption,
emissions, light oil and natural gas consumption at the intensive and extensive margin.
Starting with energy consumption, we find that the introduction of the carbon tax shows
essentially no impact on energy consumption in the first two post-policy periods until 2013.
However, in the third post-policy period when the tax was increased to 60 CHF per ton of
CO2, our estimates show a significant decrease of about 4-6% relative to the pre-policy years
indicating a lagged impact of the policy on plant behavior.13
Turning to carbon emissions, our estimates indicate increasing reductions in CO2 emissions
over time as a response to the carbon tax. In fact, we find evidence for significant emission
reductions by about 2% after the introduction of the carbon tax in 2008-09. With the increase
in the carbon tax, emissions further reduced by 3-6% in the second and between 12-15% in the
third post-policy period. Based on the observation that the average pre-policy emission level
was at a level of approximately 610 tons of CO2 (see Table 2), the estimated policy effects are
sizeable and imply cumulative reductions in the magnitude of 70-90 tons of CO2 for the average
plant 6-8 years after the introduction of the tax.
To visualize the previous results, the top panel in Figure 4 below depicts the counterfactual
and actual evolution of average (log) energy consumption and emissions levels before and after
the policy change.14 As displayed in the upper left graph, the actual (solid line) and counter-
factual (dashed line) energy consumption paths diverge in the final years of the policy period,
implying that energy consumption levels would have been slightly higher in the third post-policy
period in the absence of the tax. In contrast, the top right graph shows that CO2 emissions
would have been substantially higher in all three post-policy periods without the tax. Moreover,
the effect of the tax on plant emission is increasing over time as the counterfactual and actual
emission paths diverge over time.
A key question that arises at this point of the analysis is how the emission reductions were
achieved. We thus address the following two questions: a) Does the carbon tax affect the
plant decision to use specific energy sources? b) What is the carbon tax effect on the amount
consumed of a specific energy source? To this end, we estimate the effect of the policy change
on the consumption of light oil, natural gas and electricity both at the extensive and intensive
margin (see Table 3 for details). Given the predominant trend away from light oil to natural
gas consumption already starting in the early 2000s, the descriptive evidence in Figure 3 above
suggests hardly any impact of the carbon tax on a plants’ fossil fuel mix. Yet, our estimates
imply that the carbon tax reinforced existing substitution trends in the fossil fuel mix as the
probability of choosing light oil decreased by about 3-5 percentage points, while the propensity
to opt for natural gas increased by roughly 1-2 percentage points.
13Although not disclosed in Table 3, the coefficient on the linear time trend is significantly negative as expected
and captures arguably a general negative trend in consumption/emissions due to technological advancements
and/or other institutional changes affecting plant outcomes across all specifications and outcomes.
14The counterfactual path is constructed based on the estimates from the described FE specification by switching
off the policy indicators for all plants in the sample and subsequently generate predictions for each outcome for
all post-policy periods.
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At the intensive margin, both specifications provide evidence for an increasing negative
impact of the rising carbon tax on light oil consumption. In particular, we find that the average
plant in the sample significantly reduced the consumption of light oil by 3% in the first; between
7-10% in the second and up to 24% in the third post-policy period relative to pre-policy period.
This implies sizeable reductions in light oil related emissions of 48-55 tons of CO2 in the third
post-policy period relative to pre-policy levels.
In contrast to the simple raw pre-post mean comparison, our estimates do not indicate
an effect of the carbon tax on natural gas consumption in the first and second post-policy
period. However, we estimate a significant negative effect of the carbon tax on natural gas
consumption by about 10-14% or approximately 30-40 tons of CO2 emissions when the carbon
tax was increased to 60 Swiss Francs. Taken together, the overall reduction in CO2 emissions of
about 70-90 tons for the average plant in our sample can thus be explained by the reduction in
both light oil and natural gas consumption.
The lower panels in Figure 4 further illustrate the estimated carbon tax effects on light oil
and natural gas consumption. As shown in the lower left graph, light oil consumption would
have been substantially higher in the absence of the carbon tax, in particular in the final years
of the policy period. Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to natural gas as the tax
reduced the incentive to consume natural gas post-policy.
— Insert Table 3 and Figure 4 about here —
5 Tax intensity and plant emissions
5.1 Identification of the tax intensity effect
In a second step we estimate the differential effect of the carbon tax on plant emissions. Even
though the tax per ton of CO2 is the same for all plants in a given period (see Table 1), we exploit
the fact that the (implicit) tax intensity increases with a plants’ carbon emission intensity of its
fossil fuel mix. More specifically, plants that use a higher share of light oil per unit of energy
consumption are more exposed to the tax than plants relying more on the less carbon intensive
natural gas. We therefore compare the emission patterns of plants that are confronted with
different tax intensities in the following equation:
∆ ln (yi) = τDi + ∆x
′
iη + λs + εi (2)
where ∆ ln(yit) denotes the change in the log plant emissions over the policy period 2008-2015
or the ”placebo” period 2001-2008. Di is either a dummy that equals one for pure light oil and
zero for pure natural gas users15. In the policy-period Di,2008 – measured in the beginning of the
period in 2008 – captures a plant’s degree of exposure to the carbon tax. Consequently, τ08−15
is an estimate of whether plants with a higher tax per unit of energy consumption reduce CO2
emissions relatively more. Since we include subsector indicators λs in equation (2), identification
of τ08−15 requires plant emissions to deviate from subsector trends. As above, we also control for
15Most plants in our sample rely exclusively on light oil or natural gas as their fossil fuel.
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changes in floor size and number of employees in ∆xi. By measuring the cumulative effect on
emissions with long differences ∆, equation (2) allows plant emissions to respond gradually to
the CO2 tax over time.
16 Moreover, equation (2) circumvents issues related to serially correlated
errors and downward biased standard errors by ignoring the time series structure of the data,
as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004). To purge τ08−15 from preexisting
emission and substitution trends, as indicated in Figure 3, we subtract the placebo estimate
τ01−08 from τ08−15. The resulting (τ08−15−τ01−08) represents a tripple-difference estimate of the
carbon tax policy and takes into account potential violations of the parallel trend assumption
between plants that differ in their fossil fuel mix.17 In further specifications, we instrument the
tax-intensity measure in the beginning of the policy period 2008, Di,2008, with its placebo period
counterpart from 2001, Di,2001, which is much less likely to be affected by plant responses to
their fossil fuel mix in anticipation to the future carbon tax policy.
5.2 Results
Equation (2) is estimated in a balanced sample of plants that are present in our sample in the
years 2001, 2008 and 2015. This results in a sample that contains between 367 (see columns 1 to
4 in Table 4) and 507 plants (columns 4 to 8), encompassing all major subsectors. We start by
comparing the evolution of carbon emissions between pure light oil users (treatment group) and
pure natural gas users (control group). One unit (TJ) of energy consumption from light oil is
taxed about one third higher than an energy unit (TJ) sourced from natural gas, which reflects
the same proportional difference in the carbon intensities of the two fossil fuels (see subsection
2.2 for details).
In column 1 of Table 4, we find that during the policy period between 2008 and 2015,
plants that relied exclusively on light oil as their fossil fuel in 2008 (Di,2008 = 1), reduced
their carbon emissions by about 30% by the end of the period relative to the emission path
estimated for the average pure natural gas user (Di,2008 = 0). This result is not sensitive to
replacing the 2008 (high tax) dummy for pure light oil users with its 2001 equivalent in column
2. Similarly, we instrument the (high tax) dummy 2008 with its 2001 counterpart, which does
not alter magnitude and statistical significance of the diff-in-diff estimate in column 3. The
Cragg-Donald F-statistics is above the Stock-Yogo critical value and thus indicates that weak
identification is not a concern. This is also consistent with the fact that about 70% of the plants
in the estimation sample do not adjust their fossil fuel mix between 2001 and 2008. However, we
also note that there was already a small differential effect of the high tax dummy in the placebo
period (2001- 2008), as can be seen from column (4). We therefore remove these diverging trends
between pure light oil and natural gas users that predate the introduction of the carbon tax in
2008 by subtracting the placebo estimate τ01−08 in column (4) from the estimate τ08−15 taken
from column (1). The difference between the two τ -estimates is -0.23 and statistically significant
at the 0.01 level. This implies that pure light oil users reduced emissions by approximately 20%
compared to pure natural gas users after taking preexisting background trends into account.
16This is likely to be important since changes in plant emissions usually require long-term investment such as
building insulation that cannot be implemented over night.
17See Verhoogen (2008) for an application of this tripple-difference procedure in the field of international trade.
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In the following specifications (4) to (8), we replace the previous binary treatment variable
with a continuous tax intensity indicator measuring the share of light oil in the fossil fuel mix.
This increases the sample size to 507 since there are plants using a combination of both fossil
fuels (<30% of sample). The size and significance of the estimated coefficients are, however, not
sensitive to this change and remain unaffected. Overall, the results in Table 4 provide evidence
that plants that are exposed to a higher tax are more inclined to reduce carbon emissions than
less heavily taxed plants. This is suggestive of a positive relationship between the tax burden and
emission reductions consistent with economic intuition, in particular with an marginal abatement
cost schedule that increases with lower levels of plant emissions.
— Insert Table 4 about here —
5.3 Robustness of the tax intensity effect
5.3.1 Econometric specifications
We check the robustness of the tax intensity effects by estimating a variant of equation (2) with
our annual panel data. The new specification allows us to follow more accurately the evolution
of carbon emissions for the treatment and control group over time. Specifically, the following
equation will be estimated:
ln(yit) = τDit + x
′
itβ + φst + λi + εit (3)
where ln(yit) denotes the log plant carbon emissions over time. As in equation (2), we control
for plant size changes over time in xit. We also pick up technological, regulatory or demand
shocks with subsector-year fixed effects, φst.
18 As in equation 2, we divide the sample into high
tax (share light oil=1) and low tax plants (share light oil=0) according to plants’ pre-policy
fossil fuel mix.19 To obtain the final Dit in equation (3), we interact the high tax dummy with
treatment indicators in the vector Dt (see equation (1)) that tag the three tax regime periods
with constant tax levels.20
In the next step, we also include plant-specific trends to permit treatment selection on
differential trends. For example, light fuel consumers may be more inclined to reduce carbon
emissions over time than natural gas users for reasons other than the carbon tax, as suggested
in Figure 3. Consequently, we have an equation in mind that controls for differences in emission
levels with plant-specific fixed effects (λi), trends (λit) and year fixed effects (φt) as follows:
ln(yit) = τDit + x
′
itβ + φt + λi + λit+ εit (4)
18They are intended to capture macroeconomic shocks, as well as energy saving and policy innovations such as
the subsidy programs for renewable energy sources or building insulation.
19We only considered plants with a constant pre-policy fossil fuel mix, which applies to the large majority of
plants.
2012 CHF per ton of CO2 from 2008 to 2009, 36 CHF per ton of CO2 from 2010 to 2013 and 60 CHF per ton
of CO2 from 2014 to 2015.
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In practice, equation (3) is most easily empirically implemented by taking first differences over
time as follows:
∆ln(yit) = τ∆Dit + ∆x
′
itβ + λi + λt + ∆εit (5)
where λt = φt − φt−1 = is a new set of time fixed effects. In equation (5), the plant fixed effect
λi = λit−λi(t− 1) captures linear plant-specific trends, as discussed above (Wooldridge, 2010).
Finally, we also employ a continuous plant-specific tax intensity measure that is weighted by
the fossil fuel mix. Specifically, we define a new continuous policy variable Dit = ln(
∑2
i=1wi ×
taxit), with the weight w1 corresponding to the average plant’s share of light fuel consumption
in the pre-policy period, and w2 = 1−w1 to the share of natural gas consumption. These shares
are multiplied by the fuel-specific tax (taxit) and summed over both fossil fuel alternatives to
obtain a tax per TJ energy consumption faced by each plant.
5.3.2 Results
The treatment effect is increasing in the level of the carbon tax across, as visible in the first
column of Table 5. The estimates in the first specification including plant fixed effects and
subsector-year fixed effects suggest that carbon emissions of the pure light oil users would have
been 11% higher in the absence of the higher tax intensity when the carbon tax was at a
level of 36 CHF per ton of CO2 and 13% higher at a tax level of 60 CHF. In line with our
expectations, the magnitude and statistical significance of the carbon tax effect is reduced when
we add plant-specific trends to the specification in column (2). This indicates that some of the
carbon tax effect manifests itself in trend changes that are potentially plant-specific and predate
the carbon tax introduction. This interpretation is also supported by the results in column (2)
in which we find that the High Tax dummy turns out to be weakly significant with a small
magnitude in both pre-policy ”placebo” periods 2006-2007 and 2004-2005. We encountered a
very similar result with the long difference estimates in column 4 and 8 of Table 4 that displayed
a differential change in emissions between plants that differ in their carbon-intensity already
in the placebo period 2001-2008 (see subsection 5.2). Once we include plant-specific trends
in column (4) of Table 5, the High Tax dummies for the two placebo periods (2006-2007 and
2004-2005) become insignificant and their previous effect on plant emissions rightly attributed
to trend or absorbed by the year fixed effects. Column (4) also reveals a significantly reduced
magnitude and significance of the tax intensity effects, therefore some of the previous post-policy
carbon tax effects visible in column (4) may have been absorbed by the plant-specific trends.
Overall, it is reassuring to see that the estimates with the annual data in Table 5 are comparable
to previous estimates obtained with the long difference specification in equation (2) (see Table
4).
We also provide first empirical estimates of the tax elasticity of emissions based on our
continuous plant tax measure per TJ of energy consumption. Note that the estimates are ex-
clusively based on the post-policy sample as the tax was only introduced in 2008. Overall, our
estimates suggest a significant negative relationship between the plant-specific tax and subse-
quent carbon emissions in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5. To be more precise, we find that the tax
elasticity of emissions ranges between 0.18 with plant-specific trends (see column 6) and -0.34
with subsector-year fixed effects but without plant-specific trends (see column 5). This indicates
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that a 1% increase in the carbon tax is associated with a decrease in CO2 emissions of -0.18%
at the minimum. Using simple back-of-the-envelope calculations, applying the lower bound tax
elasticity estimate implies for example that the increase in the carbon tax between the second
and the third post-policy period from 36 CHF to 60 CHF (i.e. ∆tax =+ 66.67%) is associated to
decrease CO2 emissions by roughly 12%, which is in line with our earlier lower-bound estimates
of the policy effect in Table 3 of Section 4.2.
In the final two columns of Table 5, we replace the log carbon emissions by log electricity
consumption as the dependent variable. Since electricity in Switzerland originates mainly from
renewable energy sources such as water or wind, it is not subject to a carbon tax.21 As a con-
sequence, the introduction of the carbon tax should not directly affect electricity consumption
(placebo test). Indirectly, plants might partly substitute fossil fuels with electricity. We thus
expect insignificant or positive policy estimates with electricity as the dependent variable. Con-
sistent with our expectations, we find weakly significant positive estimates in columns (7) and
(8). This may also indicate substitution patterns away from fossil fuels towards electricity.
— Insert Table 5 about here —
6 Heterogeneous effects of the carbon tax
6.1 Effect heterogeneity by sector affiliation
In this section, we explore the potential heterogeneity in response to the introduction of the
carbon tax between plants in the industry and service sector. As indicated in Figure 1 above,
the graphical evidence suggests that while both total energy consumption and emissions are
essentially constant over time in the service sector, the opposite is true for the industry sector as
consumption/emissions display a considerable level of volatility. At least part of the persistency
in the service sector can be explained by the simple fact that most firms in the service sector are
renting their office spaces in buildings they do not own themselves and therefore usually have
less influence on, e.g., the heating technology used in the corresponding building. From this line
of thinking, it follows that one would naturally expect a smaller response to the carbon tax in
the service than the industry sector. To empirically assess such hypothesis, we re-estimate our
fixed effects specifications from above in the sub-sample of plants in the service and industry
sector separately. The corresponding results are summarized in Table 6 below.
As for the total energy consumption, our estimates indicate no impact of the carbon tax on
total consumption in the first two post-policy periods in both the industry and service sector. In
correspondence with the full sample estimates above, our estimates show significant reductions
in total energy consumption of about 4-5% relative to the pre-policy era in the third post-policy
period in both sectors providing evidence for a homogeneous response to the carbon tax. In
correspondence to this result, we do not find evidence for systematic heterogeneity between the
two sectors in their response to the carbon tax on their CO2 emissions as the policy effects
are practically identical in magnitude. Specifically, the average plant in both sectors tends to
21In addition, imported electricity was less heavily taxed by the European emission trading scheme during the
policy period
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decrease emissions by approximately 6% in the years when the levy was increased to 36 CHF
per ton of emissions and 13% in the third post-policy period. Indeed, given the substantially
higher average level of emissions in the industry sector of about 960 tons of CO2 prior to the
introduction of the carbon tax, the cumulative emission reductions amount to roughly 125 tons
of CO2 in the third post-policy period for the typical plant in the industry sector thereby clearly
exceeding the one in the service sector of about 30 tons.22
Furthermore, the next blocks of estimates provide evidence for substantial effect heterogene-
ity between the two sectors as we find sharp and significant reductions in the propensity to opt
for light oil, as well as on the amount consumed: while the negative response of plants in the
industry sector intensifies over time both at the intensive and extensive margin, plants in the
service sector solely tend to significantly reduce light oil consumption in the third post-policy
period. In numbers, while the average plant in the industry sector reduces light fuel consumption
by about 6% in the first post-policy period, the response to the increasing carbon tax increases to
reduction levels of about 15% in the second and 26% in the third post-policy period. Similarly,
the likelihood of opting for light oil significantly decreases by 2 percentage points in the second
and 4 percentage points in the third post-policy period exclusively in the industry sector.
In sharp contrast, our estimates indicate a strong negative and increasing impact of the
carbon tax on natural gas consumption in the service sector but no effect whatsoever in the
industry sector. Yet, further heterogeneity can be observed between the two sectors as solely
plants in the industry sector tend to significantly increase the likelihood of opting for natural
gas as a response to the tax indicating that the above described substitution of light oil with
natural gas is driven by plants active in the industry sector.
In conclusion, the introduction of the carbon tax indeed lead to the described overall reduc-
tions in CO2 emissions in both sectors but while the typical plant in the industry sector achieved
the reductions by cutting back on light oil or by switching to natural gas, the average plant in
the service sector reduced emissions by mostly burning less of both fossil fuels.
— Insert Table 6 about here —
6.2 Effect heterogeneity by pre-policy emission-level
In this section, we examine whether plants with emissions above the (pre-policy) median level
in their subsectors tend to display higher emission reductions relative to plants with below-
median levels of emissions. Theoretically, such a heterogeneous patterns of emission reductions
could be explained by marginal abatement costs that are inversely related to the level of plant
emissions within a respective subsector. In column (1) and (2) of Table 7 we start by estimating
a long difference specification as in equation (2) that contrasts plants with above median levels
of emissions with those exhibiting below median levels of emissions. Columns (1) shows that
plants with above-median emissions in 2008 (High emission (in 2008)) subsequently decreased
their emissions in the policy period relative to plants with below-median emission levels. We
22Note that since the sample contains roughly a 50-50 mix of plants in both sectors, our estimates imply an
overall reduction in emissions of about 70-90 tons for the average plant in the sample thus closely resembling our
main findings from above. (see Section 4.2)
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find in column (2) that high emission plants tended to reduce emissions in comparison to the
control group already in the pre-policy period from 2001 to 2008. We remove these background
trends related to emission levels by subtracting the estimate of the High emission (in 2001)
dummy (see column 2) from the High emission (in 2008) dummy estimated in column (1).
This difference of -0.14 is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and suggests that there is
carbon tax-driven positive relationship between the pre-policy level of plant emissions and the
subsequent extent of emission reductions during the policy years.
We turn next to estimating equation (1) with our annual panel data in order to study the
reaction of plant emissions, total energy consumption and the consumption of both light oil and
natural gas. Confirming previous results from Table 3 in Section 4.2, we find that the average
plant emissions fall in the post-policy years, which materialized through reductions in both light
oil and natural gas (see columns 3 to 8). A new insight is, however, that these reductions in
plant emissions and fossil fuel consumption were mainly achieved by plants with above-median
levels of emission, as revealed by comparing columns (3) to (4) , (5) to (6) and (7) to (8). In
addition, we also see in columns (7) and (8) that the reduction in total energy consumption that
can be attributed to the carbon tax according to Table 3 in Section 4.2 is again driven foremost
by plants with higher than median-level emissions.
— Insert Table 7 about here —
7 The elasticity of the carbon tax
In this section, we disentangle the reaction of plants to CO2 tax changes from reactions due to
changes in prices of fossil fuels (i.e. light oil and natural gas) net of CO2 taxes. This allows us
to provide a fuel-specific estimate of the tax elasticity following the decomposition methodology
proposed by Marion & Mu¨hlegger (2008) and Li et al. (2014).
7.1 Econometric equation and derivation of the tax elasticity
We start by rewriting the tax-inclusive gross price pB as the sum of the net price pt and the
tax per unit of fossil fuel T (1 kw natural gas or 100 liter heating light oil); pB = p + T . By
factoring out the net price and taking logs, we decompose the gross price into a tax-exclusive
net price and a tax-inclusive component ; ln(pB) = ln(p) + ln(1 + Tp ). This decomposition forms
the basis for the following equation:
ln (yit) = α ln (pt) + β ln
(
1 +
Tt
pt
)
+ x′itη +A
′
tγ + λi + λt+ εit (6)
, where ln(yit) denotes plant consumption of light oil or natural gas. Importantly, equation
(6) includes ln(pt) and ln(1+
Tt
pt
) as separate regressors in order to derive the tax elasticities from
the corresponding estimated β coefficient. Following equation (1), we include a aggregate linear
time trend t intended to capture technological and institutional developments in all estimations.
In the most rigorous estimates we employ the identical set of control variables and plant fixed
effects to equation (1). More controversially, we rely on OLS estimates to obtain the coefficients
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for the elasticity calculations. Given its relatively small size Switzerland can be regarded as a
price taker that does not affect world market prices of fossil fuels. Moreover, we also control for
annual temperature patterns and for the business cycle in order to absorb potential demand-
driven adjustments of local fossil fuel prices. As a result, fossil fuel prices are assumed to be
exogenous from the viewpoint of operating plants, at least after controlling for local weather
and economic conditions. We also care about the greater precision of OLS estimates for the
elasticity derivation compared to less precise IV estimates.
As mentioned above, the tax elasticity is related to the estimated β coefficient. We can first
take the derivative of equation (6) with respect to CO2 tax to obtain the following semi-elasticity,
∂ ln(y)
∂T = β
1
p+T , which is the percent change in fuel consumption associated with a unit increase
in the CO2 tax. This semi-elasticity must be multiplied by the tax to arrive to the final CO2
tax elasticity:
∂ ln(y)
∂T
T =
∂ ln(y)
∂ lnT
= β
T
p+ T
(7)
This derivation of the tax elasticity holds under the assumption that taxes do not influence
net prices of fossil fuels, that is ∂p∂T = 0. In other words, CO2 taxes must be fully passed on
to consumers, which corresponds to a complete pass-through of the CO2 tax to gross prices.
Due to the short tax series, we are not able to test this assumption empirically. However, an
exogenously fixed world market price for fossil fuels for Swiss consumers would imply that CO2
taxes are fully borne by domestic consumers. In addition, Marion & Mu¨hlegger (2011) and Li
et al. (2014) provide evidence for a rapidly achieved full pass-through of fuel taxes in the US,
which is responsible for a much larger share of world demand for fossil fuels than Switzerland.
7.2 Elasticity estimates
We present the estimated results of equation (6) in Table 8. Consistent with Li et al. (2014), we
observe that plants tend to respond more strongly to the tax than than to the tax-exclusive net
price, as the magnitude of the estimated β (second row) is mostly significantly larger than the α
estimate (first row). 23 An explanation might be that plants regard the CO2 tax as permanent
as opposed to fossil fuel prices that exhibit a substantial amount of ”natural” variation over
time. This can be seen from Figure 5 that plots the gross and net prices of heating light oil
(upper panel) and natural gas (lower panel) over time. The price charts are complemented with
volatility bands calculated by an exponentially weighted moving average method and displayed
as shaded areas around the price lines. This volatility measure is quite large and may reflect
the consumer believe of mostly transitory fuel price movements, while the CO2 tax may be
anticipated to be permanent and to increase over time. Moreover, we also find from columns
(5) and (6) that the effect of the tax on light oil consumption does not differ across sectors. We
employ the tax elasticity of light oil from equation (7) to the estimated β’s in specifications (1)
and (2). Accordingly, we require a value for the share of the CO2 tax in the net price (
T
p+T ) to
23This can be seen by taking the derivative of equation (6) with respect to the tax-exclusive net price and
obtain the following price semi-elasticity: 1
p
(α − β T
p+T
). The tax semi-elasticity β 1
p+T
is larger than the price
semi-elasticity whenever β > α applies.
17
calculate this elasticity. This tax fraction of the overall oil net price rose from 3% in 2008 to
about 20% in 2015 and thereby inducing plants to respond more strongly to the tax, as reflected
in an increasing tax elasticity according to equation (7). We employ the 20% tax share and
obtain a range of tax elasticities of light oil between -0.1 (based on column 2) and -0.23 (based
on column 1), both significant at the 0.01 level. It is encouraging to see that our previous
estimate of the tax elasticity of -0.18 from Section 5.3.2 lies within this range.
We turn next to the natural gas results. As before, for the elasticity calculation we employ
the share of tax in the net price of natural gas in 2015, which is 15%. This results in a range of
tax elasticities of natural gas between -0.08 (based on column 4) significant at the 0.1 level and
a non-significant -0.13 (based on column 3). According to column (8) of Table 8, the response of
the demand for natural gas to the price increasing tax is entirely driven by plants in the service
sector (elasticity of -0.17, significant at the 0.01 level), while the tax turns out to be insignificant
in the industry service (see column 7). This finding also resonates with a previous result shown
in Section 5.3.2 and Table 6, namely that the reductions in natural gas consumption in the
post-policy period have been mainly carried out by plants in the service sector. Overall, this
section confirms the previous estimations with an alternative empirical methodology used to
estimate tax elasticities.
— Insert Figure 5 and Table 8 about here —
8 Conclusion
Ever since researchers have provided evidence for a causal link between man-made emissions of
green house gases and global warming, there is a consensus that urgent actions are required to
drastically reduce emission levels and avoid the dramatic consequences of global warming. How-
ever, no consensus has been reached regarding the key question on how to efficiently reduce the
climate-damaging emissions. In fact, a broad spectrum of climate policy instruments are con-
currently in use ranging from emission trading schemes, subsidies for renewable energy sources,
emission target agreements to taxes on gasoline as well as taxes on carbon dioxide emissions.
The main goal of these policies is to provide incentives for consumers and firms alike to switch
to cleaner energy sources and/or to reduce their emissions of GHG into the atmosphere. In
light of this broad variety of potential policy interventions, empirical evidence on the impact of
various policies on energy consumption and emissions of firms and households is rather scarce,
in particular with respect to the effects of a carbon tax on firm or plant outcomes.
This paper fills this gap partly by examining the impact of a rising carbon tax on subsequent
plant behavior. Using plant-level data for the years 2001-2015, we study the effect of the
introduction of a carbon tax on energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions of plants
active in the service and industry sector in Switzerland. The Swiss settings offers the unique
possibility to observe the reaction of plants when exposed to a carbon tax that was drastically
increased by 400% between 2008 and 2015.
Our results provide evidence for a substantial reduction of plants’ carbon emissions of 12-
15%, whereas energy consumption decreased by a relatively smaller 4-6% for the average plant.
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This is consistent with tax elasticities that range between -0.1 and -0.23 for light oil and -
0.17 for natural gas, the latter being mainly driven by plants in the service sector. There is
some heterogeneity in how emission reductions were realized across sectors. While we observe
reductions in fuel consumption in both the industry and service sector (intensive margin), we
also find that plants in the industry sector increasingly switched to natural gas as a less carbon-
intensive alternative (extensive margin). Moreover, these emission reductions driven by intensive
and extensive margin adjustments are primarily achieved by more heavily taxed plants that
feature a relatively more carbon-intensive energy mix and by plants with higher than subsector-
median emission levels in the pre-policy period. More fundamentally, the general decrease in fuel
consumption is probably driven by factors such as investments in better building insulation or the
more widespread use of geothermal heat pumps. Our data does, however, not provide enough
information to dig deeper into the mechanisms through which plants achieve their emission
reductions. This would therefore be a fruitful area for future research.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Total energy consumption and CO2 emissions over time
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Notes: The figure illustrates the evolution of energy consumption (in TJ) and carbon dioxide emissions
(in tons) by sector affiliation for the years 2001-2015.
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Figure 2: Distribution plots:
Pre- and post policy change
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Notes: The graphs show the density of total energy consumption, fossil fuel emissions, light oil and natural
gas consumption pre (solid line)- and post (dashed line) policy change for the years 2001-2015.
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Figure 3: Development of fossil fuel mix
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Notes: The graphs show the average share of light oil and natural gas in the plants fossil fuel mix over
time.
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Figure 4: Counterfactual plots
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Notes: The graph shows the counterfactual and actual path of average (log) total energy consumption,
carbon emissions, light oil and natural gas consumption before and after the introduction of the carbon
tax. Counterfactuals are constructed based on the above described FE specification (1) in Section 4.
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Figure 5: Price charts of Light oil (upper panel) and natural gas (lower panel)
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Table 1: Tax burden by type of fossil fuel
Years Tax Light oil Natural gas
CHF/t CO2 CHF/TJ CHF/TJ
2008-09 12 885 673
2010-2013 36 2654 2020
2014-2016 60 4423 3366
Source: Federal Office for the Environment (2018). Notes: The
base value of the CO2 levy is in CHF per ton of CO2 equivalents.
The tax is converted into CHF per TJ. In accordance with the
predefined emission reduction path for thermal fuels, The CO2
levy was increased three times between the introduction in 2008
and 2016.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Pre-policy Post-policy
Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs
Plant outcomes
Total Energy Consumption (in TJ) 20.88 150.05 21303 22.52 143.75 23606
Total CO2 emissions (in tons) 611.94 4038.56 21303 589.46 3497.70 23606
Light oil (in TJ) 2.46 7.99 21303 1.73 5.47 23606
Share light oil (% fossil fuel mix) 0.70 0.44 21086 0.58 0.48 23521
Natural gas (in TJ) 6.29 58.75 21303 7.67 58.03 23606
Share natural gas (% fossil fuel mix) 0.30 0.44 21086 0.42 0.48 23521
Electricity consumption (in TJ) 8.86 69.38 21303 9.58 60.30 23606
Share electricity (% total energy cons.) 0.41 0.24 21303 0.46 0.24 23606
Sector affiliation
Service sector 0.47 0.50 21303 0.48 0.50 23606
Food production 0.04 0.19 21303 0.04 0.20 23606
Textile/Leather 0.04 0.19 21303 0.03 0.16 23606
Paper/Printing 0.05 0.21 21303 0.04 0.20 23606
Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals 0.04 0.20 21303 0.03 0.18 23606
Other Non-metallic Minerals 0.03 0.17 21303 0.02 0.14 23606
Iron/Steel 0.02 0.14 21303 0.02 0.13 23606
Other Non-ferrous Metals 0.01 0.08 21303 0.01 0.11 23606
Metal Products/Equipment 0.11 0.31 21303 0.14 0.34 23606
Machinery 0.05 0.22 21303 0.06 0.24 23606
Other Industries 0.11 0.31 21303 0.08 0.27 23606
Construction 0.04 0.21 21303 0.05 0.22 23606
Trade 0.13 0.34 21303 0.12 0.32 23606
Accommodation/Food Service 0.04 0.20 21303 0.05 0.22 23606
Financial and Insurance Services 0.04 0.19 21303 0.04 0.18 23606
Public Administration 0.02 0.16 21303 0.03 0.16 23606
Education 0.07 0.25 21303 0.07 0.25 23606
Health/Social Work 0.07 0.26 21303 0.08 0.28 23606
Other Services 0.09 0.29 21303 0.10 0.30 23606
Plant characteristics
Full-time employees 96.46 185.16 21303 122.83 252.15 23606
Part-time employees 21.57 79.18 21303 32.98 108.69 21454
Gross Floor Area (m2) 9089.84 24081.56 21303 10784.02 24916.98 23606
Notes: Summary statistics for the pre- and post-policy years.
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Table 3: Carbon tax effect estimates
Carbon policy effects
Outcome Variable ln(Total cons) ln(CO2 Emissions) ln(Light oil) ln(Natural gas) ln(Electricity)
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
D2008−09 (12 CHF/t CO2) 0.01 0.01* -0.01 -0.02** -0.01** 0.01 -0.01 -0.03* 0.01** 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
D2010−13 (36 CHF/t CO2) -0.00 -0.01 -0.03** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.07*** -0.10*** 0.01** 0.01** -0.02 -0.05 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
D2014−15 (60 CHF/t CO2) -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.24*** -0.21*** 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.14*** -0.10** -0.04** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Plant fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Economic activity indicators No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Observations 44909 44909 44909 44909 44909 44909 32628 32628 44909 44909 18406 18406 44909 44909
Notes: The table shows the estimated carbon tax effects on (logarithmized) total energy consumption, CO2 emissions, light oil, natural gas and electricity consumption (all in TJ) using the above
outlined FE specifications. Moreover, the table shows the estimated policy effects at the both the extensive (i.e. the yes/no decision of use) and intensive margin (i.e. the quantity response if using)
for light oil and natural gas consumption. Standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Long differences ln CO2 Emissions 2008-2015 compared to 2001-2008
Outcome Variable ∆ln(CO2 Emissions)
Period 2008-2015 (1)-(3) 2001-2008 2008-2015 (5)-(7) 2001-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High tax (Pure light oil user, 2008) -0.31*** -0.31***
(0.05) (0.05)
High tax (Pure light oil user, 2001) -0.29*** -0.08**
(0.05) (0.04)
Tax intensity (Share light oil, 2008) -0.29*** -0.29***
(0.05) (0.05)
Tax intensity (Share light oil, 2001) -0.26*** -0.08*
(0.04) (0.04)
Difference (15-08 vs. 08-01) -0.23*** (1) minus (4) -0.21*** (5) minus (8)
p-value (H0: no difference) <0.001 <0.001
Observations 367 367 367 367 507 507 507 507
Estimation OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV OLS
Instrument High tax 2001 Tax int. 2001
Cragg-Donald F statistics (Weak identification test): 4639.300 3660
Stock-Yogo critical value (10% maximum IV bias ): 16.38 16.38
Notes: All specifications include plant fixed (differenced away), trends at the subsector level and the change in log number of employees and floor size as covariates. p-values on
differences allow for error correlation between equations. Standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Tax intensity estimates
Tax intensity effects
Outcome Variable ln(CO2 Emissions) ln(Electricity)
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High tax2008−09 -0.03 -0.04* -0.05 -0.04* 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (-0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
High tax2010−13 -0.11*** -0.07* -0.13*** -0.07* 0.04*
(0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
High tax2014−15 -0.13** -0.07 -0.14*** -0.07 0.05*
(0.05) (0.05) (-0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
High tax2006−07 -0.04* -0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
High tax2004−05 -0.04* -0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
ln(Plant tax) -0.34*** -0.18*** 0.02*
(0.11) (0.04) (0.01)
Plant characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sector-year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No No No
Plant-specific time trends No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 28809 28809 28809 28809 28809 28809 28809 13548
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Carbon taxes and plant outcomes by sector
Carbon policy effects by sector affiliation
Outcome Variable ln(Total cons) ln(CO2 Emissions) Light oil (Y/N) ln(Light oil) Natural gas (Y/N) ln(Natural gas) ln(Electricity)
Industry Services Industry Services Industry Services Industry Services Industry Services Industry Services Industry Services
D2008−09 (12 CHF/t CO2) 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06** 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.03*** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
D2010−13 (36 CHF/t CO2) -0.00 -0.02 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.15*** -0.05 0.01** 0.00 -0.01 -0.08** 0.02* -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
D2014−15 (60 CHF/t CO2) -0.04** -0.05*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.04*** 0.01 -0.26*** -0.19*** 0.03*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.17*** -0.02 -0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Plant fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic activity indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 23533 21376 23533 21376 23533 21376 18296 14332 23533 21376 8563 9843 23533 21376
Notes: Fixed effects estimates of the carbon tax on plant outcomes by sector affiliation. Standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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Table 7: Above and below sector-median emissions and plant outcomes
Outcome Variable ∆ln(CO2 Emissions) ln(CO2 Emissions) ln(Light oil) ln(Natural gas) ln(Total cons)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sample wrt median emissions full sample above below above below above below above below
High emission (in 2008) -0.26***
(0.04)
High emission (in 2001) -0.12***
(0.04)
D 08 - 09(12 CHF / t CO 2) -0.03** -0.02 -0.05** -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 0.03**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
D 10 - 13 (36 CHF / t CO 2) -0.10*** 0.01 -0.12*** 0.00 -0.08** 0.07 -0.03*** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02)
D 14 - 15 (60 CHF / t CO 2) -0.16*** -0.04 -0.22*** -0.12** -0.17*** 0.16* -0.07*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02)
Diff. (08-15 vs. 01-08) -0.14**
p-value (H0: no difference) p¡0.05
Period 2008-2015 2001-2008 2001-2015 (3)-(15)
Data interval Long differences (1)-(2) Annual data points (3)-(15)
Number of Observations 507 507 21,567 9,909 16,410 7,099 10,132 3,147 21,976 16,154
Notes: All specifications include plant characteristics (change in log number of employees and floor size in columns 1 and 2 and in levels in columns 3 to 10) and plant fixed effects.
Columns 1 and 2 include subsector trends, while columns 3 to 10 employ a linear time trend. Columns 3 to 10 also include economic activity and weather indicators. Standard errors
clustered at the plant level in parentheses: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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Table 8: Tax elasticity estimates
Outcome Variable ln(Light Oil) ln(Natural gas) ln(Light oil) ln(Natural gas)
Sectors Industry & Services (1)-(4) Industry Services Industry Services
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(net light oil price, pre-tax) -0.20*** -0.01 0.03 -0.07**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
ln(1+ tax / net light oil price) -1.16*** -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.62***
(0.24) (0.13) (0.17) (0.21)
ln(net natural gas price, pre-tax) -0.11 -0.04 0.02 -0.13
(0.19) (0.12) (0.15) (0.18)
ln(1+ tax / net natural gas price) -0.92 -0.52* 0.09 -1.14***
(0.66) (0.32) (0.45) (0.44)
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic activity / weather indicators No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant characteristics No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 43,708 43,708 25,013 25,013 23,224 20,484 10,734 14,279
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the plant level in parentheses: *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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